I. INTRODUCTION In

4
JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
[Vol. 6
The affinity of Scalia and Garner's work to Story's is not coincidental. The problem that Scalia and Garner address today grows out of the failure of American law to adequately resolve the codification controversy of more than a century ago. The controversy arose out of the need of the nation for rational law to support the ever increasing volume of commerce. It pitted proponents of codes, on the one hand, who wanted systematic, rational statements of rules along the lines of the French codes of ARTICLES IN 
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1804, applied justly and predictably, against proponents of common law rules and common law methods.
The conflict concluded at the end of the 19 th centuryunresolved-with the deaths of proponents and opponents alike. Inertia, and not conscious decision, determined America's present legal methods. Throughout the century, while proponents and opponents debated the issues, legislatures churned out statutes and judges produced precedents. The bar remained unmoved in opposition to codes and unshaken in devotion to lawyer-controlled common law methods. The newly-established law schools chose to teach precedents and case law methods rather than to develop codes and statutory methods. By century's end, proponents of codes had passed away, but legislative mills ground on and judges kept deciding as they always had. Since 1900, the United States has had uncodified statutory law combined with common law methods: a remarkable and costly mismatch. Scalia and Garner try to end this mismatch; they try to resurrect interpretive methods last addressed, they say, a century ago. 10 They identify and try to kill the cause of American stagnation: common law methods. Having cleared out the clutter of common law methods, they propose textualism to move the United States forward.
Reading Law presents one possible solution to the proliferation of statutes. What makes it potentially a great event in American legal culture is its attack on common law. Not since David Dudley Field, Jr. has anyone of such stature in the American legal community sought to push aside common law methods to deal with statutes. Part II of this essay shows the attack of Scalia and Garner As interesting as Smith's analysis is, it essentially addresses a legal system that is now barely extant, the system that Holmes wrote about: the common law. That was a system in which there was little legislation, and in which judges created the law of crimes, of torts, of agency, of contracts, of property, of family and inheritance. And just as theories such as the Divine Right of Kings were necessary to justify the power of monarchs to make law through edicts, some theory was necessary to justify the power of judges (as agents of the King) to make law through common-law adjudication. 
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elected representatives is," Scalia and Garner say, "undemocratic." 12 Yet some American judges refuse to abandon "the ancient judicial prerogative of making the law." They prefer to "improvis[e] on the text to produce what they deem socially desirable results. . . . [In their lawmaking these] judges are also prodded by interpretative theorists. These are the legal realists, who have "convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law" and do not simply apply it." 13 Scalia and Garner reject the claim of these "interpretative theorists" that courts are "better able to discern and articulate basic national ideals than are the people's politically responsible representatives." 14 The result, they see, of judges straying from their function of applying law-when judges "overreach" and "fashion law" rather than fairly derive it from governing texts-is that they make law uncertain, create inequality of application, undermine democracy, and politicize themselves and their offices. Scalia and Garner are bold to take on the common law tradition; they did not have to. They could have attributed the problems they discuss to "the desire for freedom from the text, which enables judges to do what they want." 15 Instead of timidity, they show courage. They target as principal culprit the common law mindset that the nation's law professors teach. Perhaps they 8
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perceive that without disarming the common law tradition, their proposal will suffer the same fate as the few codes that were adopted in the United States in the 19 th century: death by judicial interpretation.
16
Scalia and Garner do not nip at the edges of the common law; they attack it head on and try to root out its most important manifestations. So even before they get to the canons of construction, they lob a nuclear artillery shell on the whole idea:
American legal education has long been devoted to the training of common-law lawyers, and hence common-law judges. What aspiring lawyers learn in the first, formative year of law school is how to discern the best (most socially useful) answer to a legal problem, and how to distinguish the prior cases that stand in the way of that solution. Besides giving students the wrong impression about what makes an excellent judge in a modern, democratic, textbased legal system, this training fails to inculcate the skills of textual interpretation.
17
Can this be most conservatives' favorite judge speaking? Is he ready to toss into the dustbin of history common law thinking? Yes, he is. Elsewhere, Scalia affirms that he objects to the common law "mind-set that asks, 'What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded? '" 18 In an earlier essay Scalia colorfully explains how the American image of the great judge works against good judging in a modern state. So he writes:
[T]his system of making law by judicial opinion . . . is what every American law student, every newborn American lawyer, first sees when he opens his eyes. And 16. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11, at 11 ("The nineteenth-century codification movement espoused by Rantoul and Field was generally opposed by the bar, and hence did not achieve substantial success, except in one field: civil procedure, the law governing the trial of civil cases.").
17. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 7. 18. Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11, at 13.
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the impression remains for life. His image of the great judge-the Holmes, the Cardozo-is the man (or woman) who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law for the case at hand and then the skill to perform the brokenfield running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-arming another on the right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal-good law. That image of the great judge remains with the former law student when he himself becomes a judge, and thus the commonlaw tradition is passed on.
19
This is not the image of a modest judge who applies statutes to facts.
20
In a nutshell, Scalia and Garner object to the common law ideal that judges should mold the law to fit the facts, rather than take the law as a legislative given and apply it. 21 To undercut that ethos, they challenge specific common law traditions in treating statutes.
Canons of strict construction of statutes. Scalia and Garner take on the old common law prejudices against statutes incorporated in the traditional canons that they mostly seek to resuscitate. They expose the false "notion that words should be strictly construed." Instead, citing Justice Story, they identify that what is needed is "reasonableness, not strictness, of interpretation." 22 They reject, as "a relic of the courts' historical hostility to the emergence of statutory law," the old canon that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Instead, they say, "The better view is that statutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect the change with clarity. 
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As much as Scalia and Garner would like to throw out statutory stare decisis altogether, they cannot quite bring themselves to do so. They end their book condemning it, yet acknowledging dependence on it:
Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity. Courts cannot consider anew every previously decided question that comes before them. Stare decisis has been a part of our law from time immemorial, 27 and we must bow to it. All we categorically propose here is that, when a governing precedent deserving of stare decisis effect does not dictate a contrary disposition, judges ought to use proper methods of textual interpretation. If they will do that, then over time the law will be more certain, and the rule of law will be more secure.
28
If truth be told, here Scalia and Garner are bowing to a different necessity than convenience. 29 It is a necessity of political acceptance: their originalism-based proposals will be dead on arrival if they are seen "to turn the clock back" to produce a "'radical purge' of society's settled practices and beliefs." A frequent line of attack against originalism consists in appeal to popular Supreme Court decisions that are asserted based on a rejection of original meaning. We do not propose overruling all those decisions. Our prescriptions are for the future. For the past, we believe in the doctrine of stare decisis, which will preserve most of the nonoriginalist holdings on the books. Which ones will fall depends on several factors.
[FN 38. See infra at 411-14] Stare decisis is beyond the scope of our discussion here, but it is germane to the present point that the relevant factors include the degree of public acceptance.
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III. SCALIA & GARNER: [PURE] TEXTUALISM IS THE SOLUTION
Scalia and Garner propose textualism as the solution to the problem of controlling judges who take liberties with texts. It is to be the generally agreed on approach to the interpretation of legal texts. Textualism will save Americans from politicized judges who impair the predictability of judicial decisions, give unequal treatment to similarly situated litigants, weaken our democratic process and distort our governmental system of checks and balances. It is not too late to restore a strong sense of judicial fidelity to texts. 31 Textualism, Scalia and Garner say, is not a novel approach, but "the oldest and most commonsensical interpretative principle." Scalia and Garner assert that if one is not a textualist, one must be a "non-textualist." Non-textualists come in a variety of species, the two most common of which are purposivists and pragmatists (also called "consequentialists" by Scalia and Garner). Both purposivism and pragmatism "liberate" judges from the constraints of rules. Purposivism gives interpreters the opportunity to change texts according to what they perceive to be the purposes of statutes. Scalia and Garner pigeon-hole purposivism as a license to manipulate. It produces uncertainty. Pragmatism allows interpreters to give texts "sensible, desirable results. The principal elements of textualism in its basic form are:
The words of the statute are paramount. A textualist extracts the meaning of the text from the words of the text itself and nothing more.
36
The statute is to be given a fair reading, neither strict, nor liberal. A fair reading is: "The interpretation that would be given to a text by a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, who seeks to understand what the text meant at its adoption, and who considers the purpose of the text but derives purpose from the words actually used."
37
The statute is to be understood objectively. The interpreter is to look to the words expressed in the text and not to the unexpressed thoughts of legislators. Collective bodies have no intent.
38
If the plain meaning of a statute is clear, it should be followed, unless absurd. An unambiguous text is to be applied by its terms without recourse to policy, historical arguments or other matter extraneous to the text. The legislature has stated what the law is; it is not for law-appliers to overrule those decisions.
Where more than one interpretation is possible, only permissible meanings are to be considered. Words and sentences are not to be given meanings that they will not bear. Where there is more than one meaning within a range, principles of interpretation guide interpretation. Where the principles of the common law, the canons, are numerous and particular, the principles of German law are few and general. Four approaches are dominant: 65 (1) grammatical, (2) historical, (3) systemic, and (4) purposive (teleological). 66 The classical criteria of interpretation, while they facilitate finding the correct interpretation, do not give license to go outside the range of possible meanings of a statute's words. "All further efforts at interpretation proceed on the basis of a word's possible meaning. These efforts are carried out within a range of meaning that is permissible according to linguistic usage (possibly circumscribed by legal definitions)." 67 Every approach must, however, "respect the outer bounds of grammatical analysis." 68 
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Of these four approaches, the most common is the purposive, which includes an equitable approach.
69
Variations and additions are sometimes suggested, particularly since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 (with respect to fundamental rights and the structure of the state), and the accession in 1958 to what is now the European Union (particularly with respect to harmonization of law). Whether constitutional texts should receive different treatment is debated, with no clear resolution.
Which interpretation prevails is argumentative. There is no hierarchy in applying the approaches. An interpreter may make use of all approaches and choose the approach or approaches that seem most convincing in a particular case. 70 It is said that "the decisive point of reference is the interpreter's notion of a result that, according to the 'independent function' or value of the pertinent legal provision, must be the correct one."
71
B. Pure Textualism is Uncivil
Pure textualism was the approach of the Prussian Civil Code of 1794. Its section 46 of the Introductory Part prohibited judges from going beyond the text. If the judge could not get the meaning from the text, he was to refer the legal question to a special code commission. 72 The approach was regarded as monstrous. 
22
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Doing justice is an acceptable basis for statutory interpretation. The judge asks: "Which of the possible 'justifiable' interpretations, according to the rules of the art, lead to the most just solution?"
78
The meaning of a statute may be found in the social, political or economic objectives of the law.
Judges may-exceptionally-supply law for omitted cases. 79 In filling in gaps, it is appropriate to consider societal goals, system consistency and justice. 80 Gap-filling to achieve material justice raises the question as to whether supplementation should be done politically, for the future by the legislature, or according to existing law, by judges.
81
The German system poses a challenge to Scalia and Garner: it practices textualism, but rejects its pure form and takes the poison of purposivism. It seeks to do justice in individual cases or to provide pragmatic solutions. One would expect that Germany would be a cesspool of renegade judges imposing their individual ideas of justice; yet the German system is not. To the contrary, it is known for separating policy and law, and stressing legal certainty. How are we to explain this enigma? That is the topic of Part V. By supplementing the law, the judge is functioning in a manner reserved for the legislature under a system of separation of powers. The legislature is in a better position than a court to tackle questions of legal supplementation-considerations that are often highly political in nature-and it does so with more democratic legitimacy, particularly with respect to the necessary debate and conversation with the public.
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Textualism and non-textualism coexist in modern civil law systems. They must, if law is to do its job and balance justice, policy and legal certainty.
82
A. Law in Time Requires that Textualism and Non-Textualism Must Coexist
Legislatures enact rules that apply generally today and into the future. The limits of our ability to know the present, and to foresee the future, limit the ability of legislatures to prescribe legal answers to future questions. 83 Often rules set outer limits of their application without prescribing exact decisions. They leave precise decisions to those who apply the law. They may provide criteria or procedures for decisions. Textualism defines the outer limits of decisions. Nontextualism determines how those rules are applied within the limits set. The outer limits provide one level of legal certainty to those subject to the law; 84 confidence in how those applying the law will do so within those outer limits can add a second level of legal certainty. The laws, written by the legislature, provide general rules intended to achieve justice and policy goals. Those charged with applying the law, within its limits, are responsible for reaching decisions that not only comply with the letter of the law, but that also fulfill the goal of law to achieve justice and good policy. 
24
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As we have seen, the drafters of the Prussian Code of 1794 sought to tie judges strictly to texts. If the text did not deliver the answer, then judges were to refer questions to a legislative commission. The drafters of the French Codes of 1804 charted a better and more modern course. They sought to limit judges with textualism, but to guide them with what Scalia and Garner call non-textualism. So Portalis, the drafter of the Code Civil, wrote in an essay introductory to his code: "When the law is clear, it must be heeded; when it is unclear, the provisions must be further elaborated. If there is no law, then custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the return to natural law when positive laws are silent, contradictory or vague." 85 In the modern civil law world, textualism and non-textualism can and must coexist. Portalis eloquently stated how the phenomenon of law in time requires that texts cannot be unchanging:
Whatever one might do, positive laws could never entirely replace the use of natural reason in life's affairs. The needs of society are so varied, the communication of men so active, their interests so numerous, and their relationships so far reaching, that the lawmaker cannot possibly foresee all. The very matters on which he fixes his attention involve a host of particulars that escape him or are too contentious and too volatile to be the subject of a statutory enactment. 
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finished than thousands of unexpected questions present themselves to the magistrate. For these laws, once drafted, remain as written. Men, on the other hand, never rest. They are always moving; and this movement, which never ceases and whose effects are variously modified by circumstances, continually produces some new fact, some new outcome.
86
How are Scalia and Garner and other proponents of pure textualism and originalism to answer this wisdom? It is simplistic for them to say that the legislature should amend the laws. It is wishful thinking and reminiscent of the failed Prussian legislative commission to think that we might, as some scholars have recently suggested, add procedures to refer disputed questions back to legislatures.
87
Civil law systems can read law combining textualism and nontextualism because civil law methods of writing and applying law facilitate doing so. Statutes and procedures anticipate that appliers will be making equity and policy decisions.
B. Reading Law is Doctrinal Rather than Authoritative
In civil law systems, most instances of statutory interpretation are, in the words of Portalis which we adopt here, doctrinal and not authoritative. 88 Scalia and Garner, in seeking to curtail stare decisis, would make statutory interpretation largely doctrinal. They too see authoritative interpretation as lawmaking. They would limit authoritative interpretations. They say that applying law in a particular case is-at most-a "retail" making of law: "a court's application of a statute to a 'new situation' can be said to establish the law applicable to that situation-that is, to pronounce definitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But establishing this retail application is [not] 'creating law'. . . ."
90
C. Writing Law in the Age of Statutes
Modern codes in civil law countries do not regulate comprehensively. Portalis again well-captures their methods:
The function of the statute is to set down, in broad terms, the general maxims of the law, to establish principles rich in consequences, and not to deal with the particulars of the questions that may arise on every subject. 89 . John Chipman Grey in one of his books famously quoted Bishop Hoadly, not one time, but three times: "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them. It is left to the magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to the overall spirit of laws, to guide their application.
91
In how closely they deal with particulars, codes vary from country to country, within each country, and even within themselves. Nevertheless, they have in common that they do not regulate every particular and that they do leave it to judges and lawyers to guide their application.
Modern statutes serve two purposes: to the extent they can, they prescribe rights and obligations. When they cannot do that, they prescribe who can create or determine rights and obligations and how they may do so. In other words, statutes structure authority.
In Germany, it is said that organization of authority is the "backbone" of a legal system's rational structure. 92 Authorizations take over when rules cannot direct solutions. Legislatures cannot anticipate all eventualities; they cannot rationally pre-determine what all outcomes will be. What they can do is to structure authority and its exercise. Then they do not try to calibrate all choices in advance. They let government officials or individuals subject to law make essential choices. Usually, when legislatures give others leeway in deciding, they do not leave decision-makers free to decide without limitation. Usually they require specific criteria or specific procedures for those choices. 95. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at xii. "The interpretation and development of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured; however, they are not completely capable of being rationally determined." 96. Id. at 66. 97. Zippelius gives as an example of room for judgment the term "forest." Is a "small, free-standing, natural pine woods with approximately 50 half-grown trees" a forest?" Suppose the requisite element for a crime of arson is setting fire to a forest. Classifying this stand of trees as a forest is for Zippelius preeminently a question of interpreting the statute and not one of subsuming the facts under the statute. In so doing, that interpretation then gives "meaning for future cases." In other words, the specific case "gives the impetus to weigh and to make precise the range of the meaning of the norm-with regard to the submitted facts of behavior." (emphasis in the original) Id. at 132.
98. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 135.
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concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be fragmentary, but can be gap free. 99 General clauses do not permit judges to decide what they think is "fair" or in the "general welfare." 100 Instead, case groups develop in an almost common-law manner. 101 Only where there are no prior decisions do judges have some freedom in reaching new solutions. 102 Sometimes the legislature notes the development of these case groups and enacts them into law or introduces its own groups of cases. Discretion. Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind decision-makers to one correct decision, but grant them discretion to reach their own decisions based on their own responsibility and independent choice. It is used to permit a purposeful or just decision in individual cases. 103 Administrative authorities are allowed to make policy-oriented decisions upon their own responsibility; they may choose on the basis of current and local interests among several possibilities. This freedom is acceptable 
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D. Applying Law in the Age of Statutes
German procedure supports the coexistence of textualism and non-textualism. Among the ways it does this are: (i) judges and government officials know the law (iura novit curia) and are responsible for applying it to facts provided by parties (da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius); (ii) judges and government officials must give reasoned explanations for their decisions; and (iii) judges of the intermediate level of appeal are responsible for reviewing all aspects of the decisions of courts of first instance, including the application of law to facts.
i. Judges know the law and are responsible for applying it. In the first and second instance, the focus of German judges is on whether the facts in the case fulfill the requisite elements of any legal rule. They need to know which statutes might apply and to understand those statutes well enough to know what they require. The judge is constitutionally bound to decide according to both statute and justice. Procedurally the judge is bound to clarify cases. A judge, troubled that a case may lead to a decision contrary to justice or good policy, need not twist the law to reach a good decision; he or she may better understand the facts. 
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ii. Reasoned explanations. Judges and government officials are required to give reasoned explanations for their findings of fact, conclusions of law and application of law to facts. They must deal in a prescribed form with all possible relevant laws and party assertions. Reasoned opinions are said to help make up for shortcomings of statutes. They enhance the quality of legal decisions. They provide foundations for review of decisions made. Just the knowledge that such a review is possible impels decisionmakers to self-control. It requires them to base their decisions, or at least the justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons (e.g., the statutory requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., bias and prejudice).
105
VI. COMMON LAW PROCEDURE IS A PROBLEM Scalia and Garner courageously confront common law tradition. There is to be no more judicial law making; only legislatures are to make law. Yet Scalia and Garner are haunted by common law procedure and a heritage of neglect of legislation. Their textualism is for litigation and not for life. It speaks to judges and to litigating parties and not to people. Its idea of a statute has more in common with the old writs of common law special pleading than it does with modern codes. Its idea of the role of the judge is that of an oracle who speaks law, not that of a workman who applies law. They fear a text that might give way to considerations of justice or policy, for then it would endanger the rule of law and separation of powers.
Scalia and Garner are clear that their book is a how-to book for judges, 106 especially appellate judges, who want to interpret law.
